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The Kochen-Specker theorem, Bell inequalities, and several other tests that were designed to rule
out hidden-variable theories, assume the existence of observables having infinitely sharp eigenvalues.
A paradigmatic example is spin-1/2. It is measured with a Stern-Gerlach array whose outputs are
divided into two classes, spin-up and spin-down, in correspondence to the two spots observed on
a detection screen. The spot’s finite size is attributed to imperfections of the measuring device.
This assumption turns the experimental output into a dichotomic, discrete one, thereby allowing
the assignment of each spot to an infinitely sharp eigenvalue. Alternatively, one can assume that
the spot’s finite size stems from eigenvalues spanning a continuous range. Can we disprove such
an assumption? Can we rule out hidden-variable theories that reproduce quantum predictions
by assuming that, e.g., the electron’s magnetic moment is not exactly the same for all electrons?
We address these questions by focusing on the Peres-Mermin version of the Bell-Kochen-Specker
theorem. It is shown that the assumption of unsharp eigenvalues precludes ruling out non-contextual
hidden-variable theories and hence quantum contextuality does not arise. Analogous results hold
for Bell-like inequalities. This represents a new loophole that spoils several fundamental tests of
quantum mechanics and issues the challenge to close it.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
There is a fundamental prescription in quantum me-
chanics (QM) that has been once qualified as a “precept
of the founders” [1], namely the claim that it makes no
sense to assign values to unmeasured observables. Such
a precept was turned into a theorem by Bell [2] and in-
dependently by Kochen and Specker [3], being since re-
ferred to as the Bell-Kochen-Specker (BKS) theorem. It
shows that it is impossible to construct a non-contextual
hidden-variable (HV) theory that reproduces the predic-
tions of QM. Non-contextuality means that the results
obtained by measuring an observable are independent of
any previous or simultaneous measurements on other,
compatible [4] observables. The impossibility of con-
structing a non-contextual HV theory is often expressed
by saying that QM is contextual. Now, such a feature of
QM – though being perhaps somewhat peculiar – does
not seem to frontally collide with common sense nor with
possible approaches that might be undertaken when pur-
suing scientific endeavors. Indeed, contextual models in
the social and in the natural sciences are perfectly ac-
ceptable and imply no conflict with common sense. But
the claim that we cannot even assume that an observ-
able has a value before it has been measured is certainly
at odds with common sense. Such a feature sets QM
apart from the rest of science. The idea that the value
of an observable comes into being just through its mea-
surement is something that conflicts with our most basic
notions of reality; a reality that keeps existing – so we
think – even if we do not interact with it. On the other
hand, if we assume that precise values can be assigned to
unmeasured observables, then we run into logical contra-
dictions, as the BKS theorem shows. Thus, it seems that
we must pay a high price in order to provide the quan-
tum formalism with a self-consistent ontology. This price
is the abandonment of our most basic notions of reality,
something we are reluctant to do even as practitioners
of quantum physics. Classical ontology – according to
which measurements of observables just reveal preexist-
ing values – must be replaced by quantum ontology, if we
want the quantum formalism to be not merely a compu-
tational tool, but a consistent model of the real world;
a world in which we include ourselves, if necessary, as
perceiving subjects. Now, in spite of all these needs we
keep talking and thinking in terms of a classical ontol-
ogy. This hints at a latent conflict between the quantum
formalism and its interpretation in terms of our deeply
rooted notions of reality. The BKS theorem brought this
conflict into clearest light, and even more so the version of
it due to Peres and Mermin [1, 5]. The following conclu-
sion seems therefore to be unavoidable: we have to aban-
don the naive notion of an external reality that exists
independently of us. And yet, this conclusion might be
nonetheless avoidable. Indeed, let us notice that in order
to turn the aforementioned “precept of the founders” into
a logical consequence of the quantum formalism, the BKS
theorem had to invoke another “precept of the founders”.
This precept states that some observables have infinitely
sharp eigenvalues. Any deviations from these sharply
defined (eigen)values should be attributable to measure-
ment disturbances, i.e., to imperfections of our measur-
ing devices. Alas, the two precepts seem to be in conflict
with one another. For, first, we are told to accept that
the values of an observable are brought into being by
the very act of measurement. Thereafter, we are asked
to accept that the values we have recorded by measure-
ment need not always be the “true” ones. In most cases,
so we are told, measurements show values that only ap-
proximate the “true” ones. Why should we accept this
statement without having any compelling evidence of its
truth? Paraphrasing Mermin [6], we may perhaps say
2that it has been merely reverence for the Patriarchs what
diverted people from objecting a precept that appears to
be nothing but a misapplication of the other, already ac-
cepted one. The word quantum reminds us of the strong
appeal that sharp, integer values had during the foun-
dational period of QM. The impressive successes of the
quantum formalism surely helped to firmly establish the
belief on sharp eigenvalues as a mandatory prescription
of the quantum creed. The positivist commitment of the
founders, which led them to deny the very existence of
what has not been measured, was curiously betrayed by
the founders themselves, who took for granted the exis-
tence of discrete, infinitely sharp, ideal eigenvalues. If
we instead consistently rely on measurement outcomes
alone, then we have no reason to assume that observ-
ables must have infinitely sharp eigenvalues.
Before we analyze the consequences of entertaining
the rather unusual assumption of unsharp eigenvalues,
let us consider an archetypical measurement, namely
that of a spin-1/2. Fig. (1) shows schematically the
detector part of a Stern-Gerlach array (SGA). Parti-
cles in the spin-up state |↑〉 produce a click in the (+)-
detector, and correspondingly for the state |↓〉 and the
(-)-detector. Submitted to the action of the SGA, a spin-
state |ψ〉 = a |↑〉 + b |↓〉 is brought into a spin-path en-
tangled state: |ψ〉 → |Ψ〉 = a |↑〉 |+〉 + b |↓〉 |−〉, so that
the probability that the (+)-detector fires is p+ = |a|2.
Here, it is assumed that the particle beam is well colli-
mated, so that spin-up particles can reach only the (+)-
detector. Otherwise, the measurement is unsharp. The
SGA can be taken as representative of all measurements.
It is by reading some pointer that we fix the value of
whatever observable we want to measure. Any pointer
has a finite resolution, as it is illustrated in fig. (1) by the
lengths △x±. All particles being detected within △x+
are assigned the infinitely sharp spin-value +1 (in units
of ~/2). Most particles fall around the middle of the
△x+ zone. The spatial spreading of the detected par-
ticles is attributed to imperfections of the SGA, which
includes source and detector parts. Fig. (1) shows two
fitted histograms. Let us assume for a moment that these
histograms correspond to macroscopic objects, apples of
two varieties, for example, grown in two different coun-
tries. Instead of having recorded particles’ positions x
we assume having recorded the weights w of apples in a
sample that contains the two varieties. Let w± be the
two mean values of these weights. If we weigh an ap-
ple of the sample and obtain, e.g., w > w+, we do not
interpret this outcome by saying that the true value is
not w but w+, and that any deviation from w+ must be
attributed to an imperfect measurement. This is so be-
cause we can weigh the same apple many times, thereby
obtaining values such as w ± δw, with δw ≪ w, that
average out tightly at w. Imagine now that our measur-
ing procedure is such that in order to weigh an apple we
must destroy it. In such a case, nothing would prevent
(-) (+)
Δx-
Δx+
FIG. 1: Schematic representation of the detection part (de-
tector screen) in a Stern-Gerlach array. All spin-1/2 particles
falling within the spot labeled ∆x+ (∆x−) are assigned to
the spin-up (spin-down) state. Under the assumption of in-
finitely sharp spin values, spreads such as ∆x± are attributed
to measurement uncertainties. Unsharp spin values could also
explain the observed results, similarly to cases in which one
measures classical observables – e.g. weights – of a population
containing some two varieties.
us from saying that the spread in weights comes from im-
perfect measurements and that all the apples in our sam-
ple are produced by nature with a weight that is either
w+ or w−. This is what happened in QM, which orig-
inally dealt with microscopic objects that got destroyed
when submitted to measurement. Measurement’s accu-
racy was assessed by repeating the experiment on “identi-
cally prepared” replicas, thereby taking for granted that,
say, electrons are characterized by sharply defined val-
ues. Quantum non-demolition measurements were not
available at that time. This kind of measurement is now
often applied [7], although not with the aim of testing
the assumption of infinitely sharp eigenvalues. Anyhow,
it is clear that such an assumption is not the only pos-
sible one. It might occur that, like apples, also particles
possess spin values that could slightly differ from their
mean values ±~/2. In the following, we will entertain
the assumption that observables have unsharp eigenval-
ues and study the consequences of this assumption for
some tests of quantum contextuality. As we shall see,
these consequences can be limited to HV models, leaving
QM untouched. The latter remains being what it always
has been: an ideal, extremely accurate model of physical
reality. In this model, observables are represented by op-
erators whose sharply defined eigenvalues coincide with
the mean values of measured observables.
3THE MERMIN-PERES VERSION OF THE
BELL-KOCHEN-SPECKER THEOREM
Let us address now the Mermin-Peres version of the
BKS theorem. It will be convenient to use Mermin’s
first version of it [1], that we reproduce here for com-
pleteness’ sake and future reference. This version ap-
plies to a four-dimensional Hilbert space that corre-
sponds to two qubits. We write, e.g., X1 for σ
(1)
x , the
Pauli x-matrix of the first qubit. A HV theory as-
cribes the value v(O) to the observable O. If a set
of mutually commuting observables identically satisfy a
functional relationship f(A,B,C, . . .) = 0, then this re-
lationship must also be satisfied by the assigned val-
ues: f(v(A), v(B), v(C), . . .) = 0. Thus, it must hold
v(AB) = v(A)v(B), whenever [A,B] = 0. By consider-
ing operator identities such as (X1Y2)(Y1X2)(Z1Z2) = I,
etc., one gets the Mermin system of equations:
v(X1)v(X2)v(X1X2) = 1, (1a)
v(Y1)v(Y2)v(Y1Y2) = 1, (1b)
v(X1)v(Y2)v(X1Y2) = 1, (1c)
v(Y1)v(X2)v(Y1X2) = 1, (1d)
v(X1Y2)v(Y1X2)v(Z1Z2) = 1, (1e)
v(X1X2)v(Y1Y2)v(Z1Z2) = −1. (1f)
The above six equations cannot hold simultaneously.
This claim is derived as follows [1]: The assigned val-
ues v(O) are such that v(O) ∈ {−1, 1}. This is so be-
cause in a HV-theory v(O) must be one of the possible
measurement outcomes for O. According to QM – and,
allegedly, to experimental evidence – these outcomes are
O’s eigenvalues. Now, each value appears exactly twice
on the left of the above equations. Hence, the product
of all values on the left gives 1. Since the product of the
right sides is −1, we get a contradiction. The assignment
of values under the above restrictions is thus impossi-
ble. Clearly, the restriction v(O) ∈ {−1, 1} plays a key
role. To substantiate it, experimental evidence is often
invoked. However, what experimental evidence imposes
is that v(O) = ±1+ δ±, for some δ±. Let us thus see the
consequences of imposing this last restriction instead of
v(O) = ±1.
A MODIFIED MERMIN SET OF EQUATIONS
Of course, besides v(O) = ±1 + δ±, we must include
some additional restrictions, e.g., that X1 and Y1 can-
not be measured simultaneously. Moreover, all the above
values v(O) must have an operational meaning. Taking
for example eq. (1a), we assume that it corresponds to
an experimental array that is well suited for the mea-
surement of X1 and X2. The value assigned to X1X2
is then given by v(X1X2) = v(X1)v(X2). Thus, we can
consistently write v(X1)v(X2)v(X1X2) = v(X1)
2v(X2)
2.
If we set v(X1) = ±1 + δx1 and v(X2) = ±1 + δx2,
then v(X1X2) = ±1 + δx1x2. The value of δx1x2 follows
from δx1 and δx2 in a way that the HV-model should
prescribe. We consider models for which the assign-
ments v(Xi) = ±1 + δxi reflect that spin values are
unsharp, i.e., spread around the mean values ±1, very
much like the weights of two apples’ varieties. We thus
set δx1x2 = v1δx2 + δx1v2 and replace, e.g., eq. (1a) by
(v1 + δx1)
2(v2 + δx2)
2 = 1 + 2v1v2δx1x2, with vi = ±1,
i = 1, 2. In other words, we treat the δxi as deviations
from the corresponding mean values and apply for quan-
tities like v(X1)v(X2) the rules of error propagation. Pro-
ceeding in this way, instead of eqs. (1) we get the follow-
ing set of equations:
(v1 + δ1)
2(v2 + δ2)
2 = 1 + 2v1v2δ12, (2a)
(v3 + δ3)
2(v4 + δ4)
2 = 1 + 2v3v4δ34, (2b)
(v1 + δ1)
2(v4 + δ4)
2 = 1 + 2v1v4δ14, (2c)
(v3 + δ3)
2(v2 + δ2)
2 = 1 + 2v3v2δ32, (2d)
(w1 +∆1)
2(w2 +∆2)
2 = 1 + 2w1w2∆12, (2e)
−(w1 +∆1)2(w3 +∆3)2 = −1 + 2w1w3∆13. (2f)
Eqs. (2a – 2d) involve the parameters vj and δj , with
j = 1, . . . , 4, whereas eqs.(2e, 2f) involve the parameters
wj and ∆j , with j = 1, 2, 3. They are defined as fol-
lows: v(X1) = v1 + δ1, v(X2) = v2 + δ2, v(Y1) = v3 + δ3,
v(Y2) = v4+δ4; v(Z1Z2) = w1+∆1, v(X1Y2) = w2+∆2,
v(Y1Y2) = w3 +∆3. Here, vj and wj take on the values
±1, while δj and ∆j are free parameters that besides
entering the above equations can be required to satisfy
additional constraints, such as |δj | ≤ ǫ and |∆j | ≤ ǫ,
with ǫ≪ 1. Because δjk = vjδk+ δkvj (j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4})
and ∆jk = wj∆k +∆kwj (j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}) we have more
free parameters than equations. In fact, for all possible
choices of vj and wj we can solve eqs. (2a – 2d) by ex-
pressing three of the δj in terms of the fourth, and solve
eqs. (2e, 2f) by expressing two of the ∆j in terms of the
third. In other words, we can always obtain values for
the δj and ∆j so that they satisfy the above equations,
alongside with |δj | ≤ ǫ and |∆j | ≤ ǫ. As an example,
we set v1 = −1, v2 = 1, v3 = 1, v4 = −1, ǫ = 10−3
and obtain, among other choices, δ1 = 0.887444× 10−4,
δ2 = 0.23779 × 10−4, δ3 = −0.63717 × 10−7 , δ4 =
−0.23779 × 10−4, while setting w1 = 1, w2 = −1,
w3 = −1, we obtain ∆1 = −0.15470 × 10−3, ∆2 =
−0.57722 × 10−3 and ∆3 = 0.15469 × 10−3. We have
thus exhibited a consistent assignment of values for the
set of observables entering the Peres-Mermin version of
the KBS theorem.
Let us stress that eqs. (2) follow from very general as-
sumptions. Indeed, while we have set v(AB) = v(A)v(B)
for some commuting observables A, B, we have not as-
sumed that such a product rule holds for non-commuting
observables. Had we done so, then we would have run
4into contradictions. Indeed, from an operator identity
such as [σx, σy] = 2iσz, it would follow that v(σx)v(σy)−
v(σy)v(σx) = 0 = 2iv(σz), which cannot hold together
with v(σz) = ±1. For this reason, we cannot consis-
tently apply the product rule for all the equations in the
Mermin system, eqs. (1). For example, we cannot set
v(X1X2) = v(X1)v(X2) in eq. (1a) and simultaneously
v(Y1Y2) = v(Y1)v(Y2) in eq. (1b). This is also not re-
quired when proving the Peres-Mermin theorem. Note
that while we refrain from applying the product rule, this
does not make the model contextual. We do not apply
the product rule because otherwise the model would be
inconsistent. For the very same reason we do not set for
v(X1X2) in eq. (1f) a value that derives from the values
v(X1) = v1+δ1 and v(X2) = v2+δ2 entering eq. (1a) (cf.
eq. (2a)). Eqs. (1e,1f) are thus set apart from eqs. (1a
– 1d), in the sense that they are related to quite dif-
ferent and independent experimental arrays. Indeed, let
us consider the observables X1Y2, Y1X2 and Z1Z2 en-
tering eq. (1f). Because any one of them is the product
of the other two, we need to measure only two of them
and then apply the product rule. These two observables
constitute a complete set of commuting observables, i.e.,
by fixing their eigenvalues we fix the corresponding com-
mon eigenvector. Written in terms of the eigenvectors
of Pauli-Z, i.e., Z |±〉 = ± |±〉, the eigenvectors of the
above observables read |Φ±〉 = (±i |++〉 + |−−〉)/√2,
|Ψ±〉 = (±i |+−〉 + |−+〉)/√2. That is, they consti-
tute a Bell-like basis. If we want to measure, say, Z1Z2
and X1Y2, we must set up an array that performs pro-
jective measurements represented by the four projectors
|Φ±〉 〈Φ±| and |Ψ±〉 〈Ψ±|. If, for instance, the detector
|Φ+〉 〈Φ+| fires, we make the assignments v(Z1Z2) = +1
and v(X1Y2) = −1, while we assign to the third ob-
servable, Y1X2, a value that equals the product of the
measured ones: v(Y1X2) = v(Z1Z2)v(X1Y2) = −1, and
so on. All this holds under the assumption of infinitely
sharp eigenvalues. Assuming instead unsharp eigenval-
ues, we set v(Z1Z2) = 1+∆1. Eqs. (2) refer to this case.
In particular, eq. (2f) comes from considering the iden-
tity (Z1Z2)(Y1Y2) = −X1X2 and from assuming that our
measuring device projects onto the common eigenvectors
of Z1Z2 and Y1Y2.
He have thus derived eqs. (2) by assuming realism and
non-contextuality, besides unsharp eigenvalues. We in-
troduced as much free parameters (δi=1,...,4, ∆j=1,2,3) as
these assumptions allow. One could wonder if further
constrains on these parameters could arise from the un-
certainty relations. We know that if we measure two non-
commuting observables such as σx and σy on identically
prepared systems, the respective outcomes fulfill uncer-
tainty relations. The general form of these relations reads
(∆A)
2
(∆B)
2 ≥
[
〈C〉2 + 〈F 〉2
]
/4, with [A,B] = iC,
F = AB+BA−2 〈A〉 〈B〉 and (∆A)2 = 〈A2〉−〈A〉2. Set-
ting A = σx, B = σy we get 〈σx〉2 + 〈σy〉2 + 〈σz〉2 ≤ 1, a
condition that is clearly satisfied no matter which state,
pure or mixed, is submitted to measurement. In any
case, this condition imposes no further restrictions on
the values of δ1 and δ3, which correspond to X1 and Y1,
respectively. Similar considerations can be made for the
other parameters.
In the special case when non-contextuality stems from
locality – i.e., if measurements are performed at space-
like separated locations – we can derive restricted forms
of the BKS-theorem that are expressed in terms of in-
equalities [1]. A well known one is the Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [8]. In contrast to
the BKS-theorem, which holds for arbitrary states, the
CHSH-inequality holds for maximally entangled states
and involves four observables, A1, A
′
1, B2 and B
′
2,
whose eigenvalues (a1, a
′
1, b2, b
′
2) are ±1. Last re-
striction implies that (a1 + a
′
1)b2 + (a1 − a′1)b′2 = ±2.
From this, one readily derives the CHSH-inequality
|〈A1B2〉+ 〈A′1B2〉+ 〈A1B′2〉 − 〈A′1B′2〉| ≤ 2, which QM
violates for appropriate choices of the involved states and
observables. The assumption of infinitely sharp eigenval-
ues plays an essential role here as well. By dropping it we
should be able to explain any experimental outcomes, as
we have enough free parameters at our disposal. Similar
considerations should apply to other versions of Bell-like
inequalities and to different variants of the BKS theorem
[9–11].
CONCLUSIONS
As we have seen, the assumption of unsharp eigenval-
ues has far-reaching consequences for some fundamental
tests of QM. A related but quite different subject is that
of unsharp measurements. As an example of the latter we
may refer to disturbances that could restrict the compat-
ibility of observables being submitted to sequential mea-
surements [4, 7]. One can take these disturbances into
account and still produce results that HV models cannot
explain [7]. Our approach differs also from earlier ones
that addressed finite precision measurements [12, 13].
It has been shown that finite precision does not nullify
the BKS theorem, but rather hints at a different type
of contextuality, called “existential contextuality” [14].
The consequences of assuming unsharp eigenvalues seem
to have been neglected. While finite precision measure-
ments might spoil our ability to meet the benchmark set
by fundamental tests of QM, the assumption of unsharp
eigenvalues spoils the benchmark itself. Unsharp eigen-
values surely fit among the assumptions of HV theories
and, moreover, they are not alien to QM. Indeed, let us
recall some representative cases: Atomic energy spectra
have discrete as well as continuous – i.e., unsharp – parts,
whereas in more complex systems such as semiconductors
one often deals with energy bands. Faced with the natu-
ral linewidth of spontaneously emitted light, one realizes
5that atomic energy states in the discrete part of the spec-
trum cannot be infinitely sharp. The spread∆E of a level
can be traced back to the coupling between atomic elec-
trons and electromagnetic fields that have continuous en-
ergy spectra. The coupling can then modify an otherwise
discrete part of the spectrum. Moreover, this coupling in-
volves electron’s charge as much as its magnetic moment
µ. Elementary particles are not characterized by a fixed
charge’s value, as it was originally assumed. Since long,
“running coupling constants” are routinely employed in
high-energy physics. Hence, it is not physically unrea-
sonable to assume a spread ∆µ, which in turn implies a
spread of spin’s eigenvalues. But independently of any
plausibility arguments, the fact is that there is a spread
of recorded values, which may be attributed to the quan-
tity being measured rather than to imperfections of the
measuring procedure. A consistent realist theory may
be built upon such an assumption. The BKS ban does
not apply under such circumstances, and values can be
assigned to observables without running into contradic-
tions. We could however hope to rule out HV theories
by addressing observables whose eigenvalues span a con-
tinuous range. In fact, CHSH-like inequalities have been
derived for such a case, as for instance in [15], where
eigenvalues are given by cos θ, with θ ∈ [0, π]. Now, in-
equalities follow from the fact that such eigenvalues are
bounded: | cos θ| ≤ 1. Thus, the role that was previously
played by infinitely sharp eigenvalues, is now played by
an infinitely sharp boundary. Clearly, a HV model could
here again be constructed upon the assumption that the
boundary is unsharp, an assumption that would be surely
in agreement with experimental facts.
Finally, let us notice that foundational issues such as
those discussed in this work might be relevant for quan-
tum information theory as well [16, 17]. Any quantum
device works with inherent uncertainties of the kind il-
lustrated by the SGA we have considered here. Hence,
classical analogs that mimic unsharp quantum eigenval-
ues could shed light on several issues of current interest
[18]. Of particular relevance in this respect is the recent
identification of quantum contextuality as a critical re-
source for quantum speed-up of fault-tolerant quantum
computation [19].
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